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ABSTRACT 
Kebijakan desentralisasi atau yang umum dikenal dengan istilah otonomi daerah 
mengamanatkan kepada pusat untuk menyerahkan berbagai kewenangan pemerintahan kepada 
daerah.  Penyerahan kewenangan kepada daerah ini dimaksudkan agar tata pemerintahan dan 
pelayanan publik dapat berjalan secara lebih efektif dan efisien.  Namun, peralihan sistem 
pemerintahan dari sentralisasi ke desentralisasi tidak selamanya berjalan lurus mulus. Ketegangan 
hubungan pusat dan daerah terjadi akibat keengganan penyelenggara pemerintahan di tingkat pusat 
menyerahkan kewenangan kepada daerah dan egoisme kedaerahan yang berlebihan ditandai 
dengan terbitnya berbagai Peraturan Daerah yang bertentangan dengan peraturan di atasnya. Hal 
ini mengakibatkan ketidakpastian hukum yang berpotensi memicu konflik antara pusat dan daerah 
serta antara kelompok masyarakat menyangkut hak mereka untuk mendapatkan manfaat, akses dan 
tanggung jawab atas sumber daya alam termasuk hutan. 
Keywords: decentralization policy, forest degradation, forest management, regional 
autonomy, regional governance 
INTRODUCTION 
Following regional autonomy, the political tension between center and region as 
well as among regencies in Jambi province tends heater since a wide array of powers have 
been devolved from the central government to the regency accompanied by substantial 
fiscal transfers. The legislation on which this decentralization was based also allowed for 
the creation of new regions by dividing or merging existing administrative units. In 
practice, this process has meant not mergers but administrative fragmentation and the 
creation of several new provinces and close to 100 new regencies. In Jambi province, 5 
regencies were fragmented into 10 after regional autonomy. The research area of Tebo 
regency is also the result of the administrative fragmentation of the former regency of 
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Bungo Tebo.  With some of those regencies drawn along ethnic lines and vastly increased 
economic stakes for local political interests, there have been fears of new conflicts over 
land, resources, or boundaries and of local politicians manipulating tensions for personal 
political gain (compare ICG, 2003). 
The Regional Governance Law and the Forestry Law grant more authority over 
natural resources management, including forestry, to local governments, and decisions are 
made at the lowest effective level.  This offers more opportunities for local governments, 
to manage their own natural resources.  For the regencies with rich forest resources, such 
as the research area of Tebo, the decentralization policy provides an opportunity to 
increase incomes for local people and provides financial resources for the local 
government.  However, the local policy of maximizing income has caused over-
exploitation of natural resources in Jambi as well as in many Indonesia’s regions. The 
combination of economic reasons and lack of law enforcement has been the main cause of 
a higher rate of natural resource degradation in the beginning of the decentralization era in 
Jambi (compare McCarty, 2001; Matthews, 2002). 
METHODS 
This research has been conducted in two parts, desk and field research.  It is a 
typical study based on cross-sectional primary and secondary data.  Primary data were 
collected by personal and group interviews with various stakeholders, decision makers, 
and experts as well as by fact finding and field observations. Secondary data were taken 
from laws and regulations, official reports, statistical bureaus, and other relevant data 
sources.  It can be called descriptive-empirical research and its aim is to describe and 
explain the phenomena under consideration (Niemela, 1993). 
Key person interviews were conducted to gather the perceptions of stakeholders in 
the three levels of governments.  It used a qualitative research, which is conducted by 
purposive sampling.  In all, 47 key persons representing 24 institutions of the three levels 
were interviewed.  Each level was represented by eight institutions.  A sampling-plan 
according to which interviews with institutions’ key persons has already been developed.  
However, the choice of person for each interview determined using the ‘snowball method’.  
In this method, the further interview partners are selected by considering the 
recommendation of the former interview partners (Bryman, 2001). 
CONCEPTS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization is any act in which a central government formally cedes powers 
to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial 
hierarchy (Ribot, 2002). Furthermore Ribot holds that “…political or democratic 
decentralization occurs when powers and resources are transferred to authorities 
representative of and downwardly accountable to local populations. Democratic 
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decentralization aims to increase popular participation in local decision-making.  
Democratic decentralization is an institutionalized form of the participatory approach. This 
is considered the ‘strong’ form of decentralization -the form that theoretically provides the 
greatest benefits”.   
In contrast to democratic decentralization, administrative decentralization or 
deconcentration involves the transfer of power to local branches of the central government, 
such as prefects, administrators, or local technical line-ministry agents.  In other words, 
deconcentration bodies are local administrative extensions of the central state. They may 
have some downward accountability built into their functions, but their primary 
responsibility is to the central government.   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Conflicts of Interest and Shifting Locus of Power 
Although studying decentralization in developing countries as well as in Indonesia 
is not new, the further studies concerning decentralization are still relevant since studies 
differ in their choice of topics and are also usually interesting because each region has 
different political, social, economic, and cultural characteristics.  Most case studies 
concerning regional autonomy in Indonesia focused on wealthy regions, whose income is 
generated mainly from oil as well as other natural resources such as mines and forests. 
Different from most of the earlier studies, this study was not conducted in a wealthy 
region but in Jambi, one of the poorest provinces in Sumatra, because of the following 
reasons.  First, in the logic of nature the poor regions must endure a more difficult situation 
following regional autonomy because of their higher dependence on the central 
government.  Second, Jambi has huge natural forest resources, but nearly half of its 
forests’ resources are categorized as conservation forests.  Since the region has almost no 
other alternative of income sources besides forests, the only way to increase the regional 
revenue is to exploit the forest resources as much as possible.  This condition could 
potentially lead to sharp conflicts of interest with national policies as well inter-regional 
governments. Therefore, it is very important to understand and to learn about the 
implementation of regional autonomy in Jambi.    
Conflicts of interest concerning forestry decentralization in Jambi occur due to 
different and even contrary roles and goals of the various stakeholders.  By the 
decentralization policy, much authority over forest management has been devolved to local 
authorities. Moreover, regional autonomy also promised that forest resources management 
would be conducted in a more democratic way.  The evidence in the research area, 
however, indicates that a democratic process is not automatically resulting in better 
methods of forest management.  During the implementation of regional autonomy in 
Jambi, public perception as to what kind of forest should be created and with what 
objectives has been and is an important factor in policy-making and could also be, to some 
extent, in conflict with environmental policy.  An increasing rate of forest conversion and a 
growing number of sawn timber industries in the research area are indubitable proofs that 
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regional policy on generating income often contra verses sustainable development 
principles. Since raising revenue is foremost on the minds of local governments, the policy 
of maximizing wood production will be a common problem following regional autonomy 
in Jambi.   
The massive logging practices conducted by local people in the research area are a 
complex problem. Those occur due to commercialization and marketization, which 
transform the rural economy to such an extent that traditional resource-use patterns are 
replaced with newer livelihood strategies that include commercial exploitation.  This 
situation leads to over-exploitation of forest resources in Jambi, but some argue that there 
is no reason to prohibit local people from managing forests for commercial purposes. As 
with Fisher et al. (2000), rural people also have the same rights to get benefits as their 
urban counterparts such as large-scale forest entrepreneurs.  
There are some arguments opposing and supporting forestry decentralization in 
Indonesia and in Jambi, as well.  The debates center mainly on which level 
decentralization should be implemented, and not on the idea of decentralization itself.  The 
interviews with key persons in the center, province, and regency show that the arguments 
against forestry decentralization at the regency level are generally supported by forestry 
departments (in the center and province), the province’s government and legislative 
members, the national land agency, and forest management as well as state administration 
law experts.  Some NGOs that were interviewed (WARSI, Gita Buana, and YP2M) did not 
give a specific statement concerning the level of government to which forestry matters 
should be devolved, but generally they argue that it may be better to devolve forestry 
matters to the province than to the regencies.  Summarizing the interview results, the main 
arguments opposing forestry decentralization in the regency are as follows: 
• The regencies mostly have poor human resources and less capability to manage their 
own natural resources. 
• Indonesia is a Unitarian state; any benefits from natural resources should be 
distributed equally to all regions. 
• Intersectoral coordination will be very difficult, since there is no deconcentration 
office in the regency anymore. 
• Forest is a complex ecosystem that cannot simply fragmented by administrative 
authority such regency.  Since each regency has own-plan and regional egoism, it will 
be very difficult to integrate planning. 
• Impacts of mismanagement of natural resources in certain regencies will influence 
other regencies. 
By contrast, the arguments to decentralize a large authority of forest management at 
the regency level are generally supported by the central and regency governments, regency 
legislative members and social as well as political experts.  The arguments supporting 
forestry decentralization in the regency level are as follows: 
• Indonesia has more than 100 million hectares of forest that are distributed widely over 
thousands of islands.  This condition implies the difficulties of controlling the area 
from the center as well as from provincial government. 
• Natural resources have locally specific ecological characteristic, therefore forest 
management should belong to local authorities and based on local factors. 
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• Forests have socio-cultural characteristics that should be managed with certain 
approaches.  Giving a greater authority to the regency may help to adapt local 
conditions and meet local needs. 
• The experience of imbalanced financial sharing between center and region during the 
centralized period has led to a high political demand for decentralization.  
The central government has specific interests in devolving authority to the regency instead 
of to the province level.  The potency for separatism will be higher, if decentralization is 
given to the province as an autonomous region.  This could threaten the sovereignty of the 
unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.  
According to the interviews most respondents agree that devolving authority over 
forest management to the region (province or regency) is needed.  They argue that 
adequately managing large forest lands on thousands of islands, such as in Indonesia, by 
centralized government is nearly impossible because of budgetary constraints, lack of 
institutional capacity, and local specifics both environmental and socio-cultural. 
Discourses concerning regional autonomy usually do not discuss the idea of 
decentralization, i.e. devolving authority to the region, but debate on which level of 
government and to what kind of authorities it should be devolved.  The following figure 
shows perceptions of respondents toward authority to manage forest resources. 
 
Figure 1.  Perceptions toward Forest Management Authority 
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Struggle for Authority Over Forest Resources 
Forest is one of the most important sources of revenue in Jambi. Therefore, the 
struggle for authority over forest resources often causes legal conflicts between center and 
region (province or regency) as well as among regencies in the research area.  This section 
will discuss the interesting case of the struggle for authority over natural resources 
between center and regencies in Jambi province.  Soon after the enactment of the regional 
autonomy law, many regions responded by establishing a number of regional regulations.  
Some of those regional regulations are intended to fill the ‘holes’ of technical guidance of 
the Regional Autonomy Law.  On the other hand, they create further problems because 
they are mostly intended only to increase regional income without considering higher-level 
regulations or long-term sustainability. 
Considering that central government cannot adequately manage and effectively 
control the vast production forests, the central government through the Forestry Minister 
enacted Decree 05.1/2000, which gave the regency heads the right to hand out 100 ha 
logging licenses called IPHH (Ijin Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan).  By promising attractive 
income, the policy of IPHH had a great response both from the local government and the 
local community in Jambi.  
However, the practices of IPHH are uncontrollable.  Since there is no clear 
limitation on the number of licenses to be given, the regency heads release as many as 
number of IPHHs in their own region.  The result is a very high rate of forest degradation, 
mainly because of legalized ‘illegal’ logging practices with a sheltered by the regional 
regulations in the name of IPHH.  Thus, the Forestry Minister stopped the practice of 
IPHH by enacting Forestry Minister Decree 541/2002 to cancel the previous decree 
05.1/2000. The new decree withdraws the authority of regency heads to hand out 100 ha 
logging licenses.  
The regional governments in Jambi, both province and regencies, resisted the 
Forestry Minister Decree 541/2002.  By a political agreement concluded on April 25th, 
2002 and signed by the governor, all heads of regencies (Bupati), and all chairs of the local 
parliament (Ketua DPRD), the regional governments of Jambi stated that the substance of 
the Forestry Minister Decree 541/2002 is not compatible with Regional Autonomy Law 
22/1999, Forestry Law 41/1999 and Government Regulation 25/2000 on the authority of 
central government and provinces.  According to this argument, the regional governments 
in Jambi decided to refuse Forestry Minister Decree 541/2002 with a promise to “postpone 
the implementation of the Forestry Minister Decree”.  The implication of this political 
statement is that all forestry business related 100 ha logging licenses (IPHH) in Jambi must 
follow the previous regional regulations instead of the forestry minister decree.   
This indicates that instead of stakeholders’ participation, the experience of IPHH in 
the research area has been characterized by ‘popular’ participation.  Actually in the 
research area, participation in logging practices (IPHH) could raise both local government 
revenue and local people’s income.  However, the other people must reap negative impacts 
of IPHH due to forest resources degradation.   
Besides Forestry Minister Decree 541/2002, Government Regulation 34/2002 on 
Forest Arrangement and Forest Management Planning was also rejected in Tebo regency 
(research area) and some other regencies in Jambi.  The head of Tebo regency released an 
33 
 
official letter of objection 522/789/DINHUT/2002 sent to the chair of the National 
Parliament, Supreme Courthouse, and Minister of Internal Affairs and Regional 
Autonomy. Tebo regency refused the afore mentioned government regulation because of 
the following arguments: 
• Government Regulation 34/2002 did not follow the spirit of decentralization and 
contradicted the substances of the Regional Autonomy Law 22/1999 (then replaced by 
Law 32/2004) and the Government Regulation 25/2000.  The Regional Autonomy 
Law 22/1999 stated that the region has all government authorities except defense and 
security, judicature, foreign affairs, monetary and fiscal, and religion.   
• The substance of government regulation is very centralist.  This means that the 
authority of central government, particularly of the Ministry of Forestry, is too 
dominant.  In practice, this regulation could not be implemented because after regional 
autonomy all Regional Forestry Administrations (deconcentration agencies) were 
liquidated into regency. 
• The high rate of forest degradation occurred because the regency did not receive a full 
authority to manage its own forests.  Therefore, the regency of Tebo resisted the 
Government Regulation 34/2002 and officially requested a judicial review by the 
Supreme Court.    
The Jambi Forestry Office made the opposite arguments in responding with the 
Government Regulation 34/2002.  According to the forestry official of Jambi province, 
Government Regulation 34/2002 is not contrary either to Regional Autonomy or to 
Government Regulation 25/2000.  The following arguments support the Government 
Regulation 34/2002. 
• According to the Regional Autonomy Law, the authority of the regency involved all 
government authorities except some other policies. The authorities that must be 
decentralized to the regencies are the authorities in the following fields: infrastructure, 
health, education, industry, trade and investment, environment, agriculture, 
cooperative, and lab our. The regency does not have the government authorities in 
defense and security, judicature, foreign affairs, monetary and fiscal, religion and 
authority in other sectors.  The forestry sector is one of ‘the other sectors’, to which is 
given the authority to manage natural resources. 
• The province has the government authorities of the natural resources management, 
which lie in the inter-regencies and involving forests.  As mentioned previously, the 
authority of the regency includes all government authorities besides the exceptions.  
The Regional Governance Law also states that it needs the further implementing 
legislations, which are ordered by government regulation. 
• As per its title, the Government Regulation 25/2000 is only adjusted to the central 
government and the province.  It is clearly stated in the legal explanation that the 
authority over the regency does not existed in this regulation.  Regarding these 
arguments, the forestry officer holds that Government Regulation 34/2002 is not 
contradictory to Regional Autonomy Law and other Government Regulation.  
Therefore, the implementation of this regulation is a must. 
Both cases show how the struggle for authority between center and region has occurred in 
Jambi.  Generally, it indicates that the struggle for authority in the forestry sector occurs 
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due to a number of differences in central and regional preferences for forest resources 
management.  
CONCLUSION 
Decentralization and its usual accompanying concepts like participation and co-
management generally hold prospects for increasing proximity to clients, appreciating 
local ownership, reducing transaction costs, increasing equity, and enhancing 
sustainability.  Since the enactment of Regional Governance Law 22/1999 (then replaced 
by Law 32/2004) and the renewal of Basic Forestry Law 5/1967 by Forestry Law 41/1999, 
there has been a fundamental shift in many areas of forestry matters from central 
institution to the region.  It is intended to give more attention to local needs and take into 
account the interests of local people.  
Besides the positive impacts, decentralization in forestry holds a number of perhaps 
illusory and unkempt promises. Decentralization is also not immune from capture by 
personal or group interests and manipulation.  Decentralization does not mean that local 
communities or groups magically have the capacity for sustainable forest management.  
The growing practices of illegal logging and larger degraded forests in the research site of 
Jambi province as well as Tebo regency provide a refutable evidence that removal of 
central control over natural resources to regional authorities during the process of 
decentralization led to virtually no control at all, due to the ambiguous and contradictory 
regulations.  Moreover, lack of skills, increased population, mercerization, and conflicts of 
interest also influenced to the in-sustainability of Jambi forest. Conflicts of interest 
concerning forestry decentralization in Jambi occur due to different and even contrary 
roles and goals of the various stakeholders.  Given the phenomenon of high forest 
degradation in Jambi, there are fears and some real risks that some types of competition 
between multiple interests of the center and region as well as among regions can lead to 
forest degradation.  
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